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I. Introduction
by Robert C. Long, Esq.
The Changing Nature of Pension Plans and Retiree Medical Benefits:
What the Private Sector Experience Portends for the Looming Crisis
in the Public Sector
Retirement benefits provide a critical
ingredient to the income security of
today’s workers.  In 2004, 81.2 million
employees (52 percent of all workers)
worked for an employer that sponsored
a retirement plan.1  Of these employ-
ees, 63.9 million participated in their
employer’s plans, which equates to
41.9 percent of all workers.2   While
employer-provided retirement plans in
the private sector date only from the
late nineteenth century, the public
sector has been providing pensions for
its workers since the Roman Empire.3
By 1930, virtually all federal workers
and a majority of state and local
workers were covered by pensions,
whereas coverage in the private sector
was as low as 10 to 12 percent of the
labor force.4   Today 98 percent of state
and local government workers partici-
pate in some type of retirement plan,5
as compared to only 51 percent of
workers in the private sector.6
Although the private sector
continues to lag behind the public
sector with respect to overall participa-
tion in retirement plans, it has been in
the forefront of the most dramatic
change in the U.S. retirement system
during the last quarter of the
twentieth century: the decline of
“traditional” defined benefit (DB)
plans and the rapid growth of defined
contribution (DC) plans, especially the
401(k) plan.  The debate over whether
to shift away from DB plans and
toward DC plans is now squarely
before state and local government
policy makers, as state and local
governments face billions of dollars of
unfunded pension liabilities.
The private sector has also been
leading the way in making changes in
the area of retiree medical benefits.  In
the past decade, the percentage of
private sector employers offering
retiree medical benefits has declined
sharply.  In contrast, the percentage of
state governments offering retiree
medical benefits has actually in-
creased over the same time period,
even though states are at a loss for
revenue sources to fund the rapidly
rising cost of these benefits.
This article will focus on the
reasons behind the dramatic changes
that have taken place in the private
sector and on the effect these changes
will have on the public sector.  Part II
provides an overview of the shift from
DB plans to DC plans in the private
sector, the reasons behind this trend,
and the mounting pension crisis in the
public sector. Part III analyzes the
trend of declining retiree medical
benefits in the private sector and
whether certain accounting changes in
the public sector will have an impact in
this area.  Finally, Part IV examines the
reasons behind the differeing ap-
proaches taken by the private and
public sectors and whether these
differences will keep the public sector
from following the private sector’s path.
II. Pension Plans: Recent
Trends in the Private Sector
and the Effect on the Public
Sector
There are two basic types of retirement
plans: defined benefit (DB) plans and
defined contribution (DC) plans.  In a
DB plan, the employer guarantees an
annual benefit amount at retirement
based on a specified formula that may
depend on the employee’s years of
service, age at retirement and either
ending salary or average salary over the
last few years of service.  In contrast, in
a typical DC plan, the employer and
employee make specified contributions
to an account established by the
employer, and the final retirement
benefit reflects the total of employer
contributions, employee contributions
and investment gains or losses.7   In DB
plans, the employer controls all
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investment choices and shoulders the
investment risk, whereas, in DC
plans, the employee is responsible for
investment decisions and investment
risk.
Following World War II and into the
1970s, DB plans became the plan of
choice in both the public and private
sector.8   However, between 1983 and
2002,9  the number of private defined
benefit plans decreased from 175,14310
to 47,369 plans,11  with the sharpest
decline occurring between 1985 and
1992, when there was a 48 percent
decrease in the number of plans.
During this same time period, defined
contribution plans increased from
427,70512  to 685,943 plans.13  Today’s
defined contribution plans account for
93 percent of total private pension
plans.  With respect to the number of
actively working participants, the
trend is the same. DB plans experi-
enced a decline in participation from
30.2 million participants in 198414  to
21.6 million in 2002.15   On the other
hand, DC plans experienced an
increase in participation from 12
million in 198516  to 52.9 million in
2002.17
In addition to terminating DB
plans, private employers have been
“freezing” plans in some manner for
current and/or new workers.  Employ-
ers have implemented three primary
types of pension freezes: (1) a hard
freeze; (2) a soft freeze; or (3) a partial
freeze.18   A hard freeze discontinues
the accrual of benefits to all current
and future plan participants from
either additional tenure or increases
in compensation.  A soft freeze limits
increases in accrued benefits for
current participants for additional
years of participation, but not for
increases in compensation.  A partial
freeze occurs when the plan is frozen
for some, but not all participants, such
as all new employees.19   While pension
freezing is not a new phenomenon,
what’s unusual is the number of large,
financially healthy companies that
have recently announced pension
freezes.20   In 2003, the most recent
year for which data is available, 10.1
percent of single-employer plans with
less than 100 participants were hard
frozen, whereas only 2.2 percent of
plans with 5,000 or more participants
were hard frozen.21   Since 2004,
sixteen companies with 5,000 or more
participants have frozen their plans in
some manner, including Verizon,
IBM, Sears, Lockheed Martin and
Sprint.22   Of these companies, seven
instituted hard freezes, four instituted
partial freezes, and five instituted
freezes as to new employees only.  As a
result of the freezes, companies have
either introduced a 401(k) plan or
enhanced their existing 401(k) plan.
The public sector, on the other
hand, has not experienced this same
trend, at least not to the same degree.
In 1998, the most recent year for which
the Bureau of Labor Statistics
surveyed this data, 90 percent of state
and local government workers partici-
pated in a DB pension plan.23   With
respect to all types of retirement plans,
the number of plans has declined
somewhat, from 3,075 in 1981 to 2,659
in 2004.24   However, there was an
increase in active participants from
10.3 million to 14.2 million over the
same time period.25   Interestingly,
between 1994 and 1998, there was an
increase in the percentage of workers
participating in public sector DC plans
from 9 percent to 14 percent.  This was
likely due to more state employers
exploring DC plan approaches, often
times to supplement rather than
replace DB plans.
Although researchers and scholars
have suggested several explanations
for the shift from DB plans to DC plans
in the private sector, two of these seem
the most likely to have an impact on
the types of pensions offered in the
public sector: (1) government regula-
tion and (2) the business environment
and risk associated with funding and
managing pension plans.26
A. Government Regulation:
Reforms in the Disclosure
Requirements for Private
Sector and Public Sector Pen-
sion Plans
1. The Evolution of Disclosure
Requirements for the Private
Sector 1985 - 2006
In 1973, the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) was estab-
lished as the designated organization
in the private sector for setting
standards of financial accounting and
reporting.  To this end, in 1985, the
FASB issued Financial Accounting
Statement No. 87: Employers’ Ac-
counting for Pensions (FAS 87).  The
fundamental objective of FAS 87 was
to change the manner in which
pension plan costs are recognized on a
company’s financial statements to
provide a more realistic picture of
these costs.27   Prior to 1985, no asset or
liability was recorded and reported for
the year unless the amount paid into
the pension fund by the employer was
different from the amount expensed by
the employer during that year through
the payment of pension benefits.
Unrecognized was the real pension
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obligation, the current value of the
pension plan assets, prior service costs
(retroactive benefits), and unrealized
gains and losses of plan assets.
FAS 87 required companies to
recognize pension expenses as a
liability based on the company’s
accumulated benefit obligation, which
was the actuarial present value of
benefits attributed by the pension
benefit formula to service before a
specified date, and is based on each
employee’s service and compensation
prior to that date.  The accumulated
benefit obligation, however, included
no assumptions about future compen-
sation levels.FAS 87 required immedi-
ate recognition of a liability when the
accumulated benefit obligation ex-
ceeded the fair value of plan assets.28
The Board concluded, however, that
disclosure in financial statements of
an unfunded liability in its entirety
would be too great a change from past
practice.  Therefore, companies were
required to disclose in their Statement
of Financial Position only the
projected benefit obligation, which
takes into consideration projected
salary increases, and the various
components of the net pension cost.
The total unfunded liability had to be
disclosed within a company’s annual
report, but could be hidden in a
footnote.  Nevertheless, as evidenced
by the sharp decline in the number of
DB plans offered by private sector
employers between 1985 and 1992,
this new method of accounting for
pension costs in the private sector
played a major role in encouraging
employers to shift from DB plans to DC
plans during this time period.
Although FAS 87 required the use of
the accumulated benefit obligation for
purposes of recognizing either an asset
or a liability in the pension fund, it did
not require companies to disclose the
amount of this obligation, unless the
obligation was greater than the value
of the pension plan assets.  In 2004, the
FASB issued Financial Accounting
Statement No. 132R (FAS 132R)
which required that the accumulated
benefit obligation be reported under all
circumstances. FAS 132R also re-
quired the disclosure of expected
benefit payments for each of the next
five years and the aggregate payment
amount for the subsequent five-year
period. A related new disclosure is that
of the company’s expected contribution
to the plan for the forthcoming year.
These disclosures should help inves-
tors and employees alike assess
whether expected benefit payments
are adequately funded, and may
represent the most important new
provisions of the statement.29
On September 29, 2006, the FASB
issued Financial Accounting State-
ment No. 158 (FAS 158), which makes
it even easier for investors, employees,
retirees and others to understand and
assess an employer’s financial position
and its ability to fulfill the obligations
under its benefit plans. FAS 158,
which governs employers’ accounting
for defined benefit pensions, retiree
healthcare and other postretirement
plans, requires employers to: (1)
recognize the overfunded or
underfunded status of a defined benefit
retirement plan as an asset or liability
in its statement of financial position;
(2) recognize changes in the funded
status in the year in which the
changes occur; and (3) measure the
funded status of a plan as of the date of
its year-end statement of financial
position.30   Under past accounting
standards, employers reported an
asset or liability that almost always
differed from the plan’s funded status
because previous accounting stan-
dards allowed employers to delay
recognition of certain changes in plan
assets and obligations that affected the
costs of providing such benefits. In
addition, past standards only required
an employer to disclose the complete
funded status of its plans in the notes
to the financial statements. For
publicly-held companies, the disclo-
sure requirements of FAS 158 are
effective as of the end of the fiscal year
ending after December 15, 2006, and
for all other entities, as of the end of the
fiscal year ending after June 15,
2007.31   With all of this information
front and center on a company’s
financial statements, shareholders
will undoubtedly be more vocal about
the provision of DB plans and retiree
health benefits, which will likely
increase even further the trend toward
terminations and freezes of these types
of benefit plans.
2. Disclosure Requirements in the
Public Sector
The Governmental Accounting Stan-
dards Board (GASB) is the public
sector equivalent to the FASB.  In
1994, nine years after the FASB issued
Statement 87, the GASB issued
Governmental Accounting Statement
No. 27: Accounting for Pensions by
State and Local Governmental Em-
ployers (GASB 27).  Like its private
sector predecessor, GASB 27 requires
state and local governmental employ-
ers to measure and disclose their
pension expenditures on the accrual
basis of accounting.32   Therefore, if the
accumulated benefit obligation for the
employer is equal to the value of the
assets in the pension fund, the
employer does not have to recognize
and disclose a liability.
Because GASB 27 was not issued
until the end of 1994 and did not
become effective until mid-1997, its
effect on the public sector has been
somewhat delayed.  Since 1995, and
almost certainly partly in response to
GASB 27, the number of DC plans in
state and local governments has
grown significantly. Currently, all
fifty states offer DC plans either as a
primary mandatory plan, an optional
plan or a supplemental plan.33   The
disclosure requirements of GASB 27
are also reflected in the growing
reassessment and curtailment of DB
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plans, even though this trend is
somewhat tepid as compared to the
scope and rate of change experienced in
the private sector after FAS 87 was
issued in 1985.  For example, West
Virginia closed its teacher’s DB plan to
new hires, Michigan replaced its DB
plan with a DC plan for all state
employees hired after March 31, 1997,
and Alaska offers only a 401(k)-style
option to state employees hired after
July 1, 2006. And, in Colorado,
Florida, Montana, North Dakota,
Ohio and South Carolina, new employ-
ees must elect to be members of either
a defined benefit plan or a defined
contribution plan, and there is limited
availability to transfer between the
two types of plans.34   The former head
of the New York State Retirement
System, the second largest public-
sector pension system in the nation,
has reported that, when he was in
office, there was “great pressure” to
convert public workers’ DB pensions
into 401(k)-style DC plans.35
B. The Risk Associated With
Funding and Managing Pension
Plans
1. The Private Sector
Between 2000 and 2004, 595 under-
funded pension plans were termi-
nated, 157 more than during the
previous five-year period.36 As a
result, the pension insurance system
for the private sector, the Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC),
is currently underfunded by approxi-
mately $23 billion, including a recent
takeover of plans at United Airlines
with some $6.6 billion in claims.37
According to the executive director at
the PBGC, total pension shortfalls for
all corporate plans could be as much as
$450 billion.38
As a result, on August 17, 2006,
President Bush signed into law what
has been called “one of the most
sweeping reforms of the retirement
plan universe.”39  The law requires
companies to fully fund defined benefit
pension plans within seven years,
closes loopholes allowing underfunded
plans to skip payments and forces
companies that underfund their plans
to pay higher premiums to the
PBGC.40  One very important provi-
sion defines changes made to the
method for calculating the yearly
minimum required contribution.  Un-
der the new provision, the minimum
required contribution depends on a
comparison of the value of the plan’s
assets, determined by using the fair
market value of the assets, with the
plan’s funding target and target
normal cost.41   The funding target is
the present value of all benefits
accrued or earned as of the beginning
of the plan year, and the target normal
cost is the present value of benefits
expected to accrue or be earned during
the plan year.42  Previously, the
amount of required annual contribu-
tions consisted of a comparison
between the value of the assets, which
was determined by making assump-
tions based on one of several actuarial
cost methods that could be changed
from year to year, and the cost of
future benefits for current employees
broken up into annual charges.43   The
new law provides a more realistic
picture of a company’s minimum
required contribution, which could
assist in preserving workers’ future
retirement benefits, but is also likely
to result in even more defined benefit
plans being terminated or frozen.
In addition, the FASB continues to
make changes to disclosure require-
ments which will make the numbers
reported on company income state-
ments and balance sheets more
volatile. Phase one of the FASB’s
planned changes concluded with the
issuance of FAS 158, which is aimed at
providing a more realistic assessment
of pension plan finances by requiring
that the unfunded liabilities for
pension and retiree health benefits
appear front and center on the
company’s balance sheet, rather than
hidden in a footnote.44   For example, at
the end of 2004, General Motors
Corporation’s pension plan had a
shortfall of $7.5 billion, and its retiree
health-care plans were underfunded
by $57 billion.  However, in order for
investors to find this information, they
had to locate footnote 16 within GM’s
196-page annual report.45  The un-
funded liabilities will also be measured
using the current market value of plan
assets rather than some smoothed
average, which is what the law
currently requires.46   Morgan Stanley
estimates that, because only one-third
of the amount of retiree benefits are
currently reflected on company bal-
ance sheets, if companies disclosed
their full pension and other retiree
obligations based on the new valuation
method, reported liabilities would soar
40 percent, to nearly $1 trillion.47   It is
no wonder that even healthy compa-
nies are opting to terminate or freeze
their defined benefit pension plans.
2. The Public Sector
The pension funding levels for the
largest 125 state retirement systems
went from being overfunded by $221
billion in 2000 to being underfunded by
$431 billion in 2003.48   In 2004, 104
state retirement systems reported
figures showing that they were
underfunded by $261.1 billion.49
Although it is difficult to compare this
figure with the amount of underfunding
in 2003 because only 104 systems were
included, there was still a notable
jump in the value of pension assets in
2004.In 2005, only 58 state retirement
systems reported their pension
figures. These state pensions are
underfunded by $149.6 billion, which
is only slightly less than the amount
these same pension plans were
underfunded in 2004 - $151.5 billion.50
Local governments are also being hit
hard.  Although there are no exact
figures as to the extent of the damage,
many cities are having to raise
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property taxes upwards of 50 percent
and cut services to cover increased
pension costs.51   Pension experts
believe that, if public plans calculated
their pension obligations using the
more conservative actuarial assump-
tions that private funds utilize, the
amount of underfunding would be
closer to $700 billion,52   a number that
does not include the amount of retiree
health benefits promised to present
and future public retirees. The bill for
these benefits at both the state and
local levels could top $1 trillion.53
The reasons underlying the bur-
geoning public pension crisis are
twofold: bad planning and poor policy
decisions. First, because there is no
governmental regulation requiring
states to fund at a certain level, a
majority of states made a conscious
decision to underfund their pension
accounts to finance other priorities
such as Medicaid and education.54
Second, even as the first signs of a
problem were beginning to appear,
states continued to sweeten their
pension benefits.55   Although Illinois is
the fifth-wealthiest state in total
income, Illinois has been avoiding its
pension-funding responsibilities for
more than thirty years.56   As a result,
the state has the nation’s largest
unfunded pension debt, currently
calculated at $42 billion.57   In addition,
Illinois has a funding ratio of assets to
liabilities of 58 percent.58   Neverthe-
less, in 2006, the Illinois legislature
passed what has been referred to as
“Pension Holiday” legislation, which
allows Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich to divert $2.3 billion from
public pensions to balance the State
budget over the next two years.59
Although there are also reform
measures contained in the bill, such as
capping pay increases at 6 percent
during the four final years of
employment and requiring that any
newly enacted retirement benefit
receive full funding and a five year
expiration date, the legislation does
nothing to help decrease the already
overwhelming pension debt that the
state is currently facing.60
Public pension benefits are gener-
ous when compared to the average
benefits received by workers in the
private sector.  As reported in a recent
cover story in USA Today, “Retired
government workers are twice as
likely to get a pension as their
counterparts in the private sector, and
the typical benefit is far more
generous.  The nation’s 6 million
retired civil servants – teachers,
police, administrators, laborers –
received a median benefit of $17,640 in
2005, according to the Congressional
Research Service. Eleven million
private-sector retirees covered by
traditional pensions got $7,692.”61
Even companies that are touted as
having the best benefits in the
country, such as Philip Morris,
Schering-Plough and Phelps Dodge,
provide pension benefits that amount
to only about 30 percent to 50 percent
of the employee’s final pay.62   Although
one could argue that the pension
benefits in the private sector are lower
because employees also receive Social
Security benefits, the fact of the
matter is that “three-fourths of
government workers participate in
Social Security, but their overall
benefits have not been reduced
accordingly.”63  The fact that public
sector employees often make signifi-
cant contributions to their DB
retirement plans from their earnings
over the course of their careers (this is
especially true of the police officers and
firefighters), is likely to be lost in the
brewing public debate over policy
choices that will have to be made as the
government’s share of the cost of these
DB plans comes due.
III. Retiree Medical Benefits
A. Trends in the Private Sector
Although retiree medical benefits were
never a common benefit in the private
sector, in recent years, they have
become even rarer.  The percentage of
private-sector employers with 500 or
more employees offering medical
benefits to early retirees (pre-65) has
declined from 46 percent in 1993 to 28
percent in 2004.64   A similar decline
took place with respect to retiree
health benefits offered by these same
employers to Medicare-eligible retir-
ees, from 40 percent to 20 percent.  In
addition, the provision of retiree
medical benefits to early retirees who
worked for companies with 1,000 or
more employees declined from 88
percent in 1991 to 68 percent in 2003,
and the provisions of these benefits to
Medicare-eligible retirees decreased
from 80 percent to 56 percent. 65
The majority of employers who
continue to offer retiree medical
benefits have made substantial changes
to the benefits package and eligibility
requirements.  Changes to the benefits
package include an increase in the
premiums that retirees are required to
pay, limited or reduced benefits and
adoption of access-only plans.  For
example, SBC and Caterpillar have
scaled benefits way back, requiring
retirees to pay bigger deductibles or a
larger share of their health insurance
premiums.66  And, in a landmark
concession last year, the United Auto
Workers agreed to a similar change in
its contract with General Motors.67
The percentage of employers with 500
or more employees requiring early
retirees to pay 100 percent of the
premium increased from 31 percent in
1997 to 38 percent in 2000.68   The
amount increased by 10 percent over
the same period for employers offering
retiree health benefits to Medicare-
eligible retirees.69  With respect to
eligibility requirements, the percent-
age of employers requiring employees
to work to at least age 55 and have at
least ten years of service increased
from 30 percent in 1996 to 38 percent
in 2003.70   Many companies, such as
ConocoPhillips and Coca-Cola Enter-
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prises, are also capping their total
retiree healthcare outlays at some
specified dollar amount. Once the
company hits the cap, retirees have to
assume any additional costs for their
coverage.71   In a recent settlement
between Goodyear and the United
Steelworkers over such cost caps,
Goodyear  bailed out of providing
retiree medical benefits entirely in
exchange for a one-time payment of $1
billion in cash and Goodyear stock and
diversion of future COLA and Profit
Sharing payments into a separately
administered Voluntary  Employees’
Beneficiary Association (VEBA).72
Although it is likely that several
factors played a role in the decline in
the percentage of private-sector
employers offering retiree medical
benefits, one of the primary trigger
events can be traced back to December
1990, when the FASB issued Financial
Accounting Statement No.106: Em-
ployers’ Accounting  for  Postretirement
Benefits Other then Pensions (FAS
106).73   Similar to FAS 87, FAS 106
markedly changed the manner in
which most private-sector employers
accounted for retiree medical benefits
by requiring employers to accrue and
expense certain future claims’ pay-
ments as well as actual paid claims.74
Due to the dramatic impact that
recognition of this expense has on a
company’s financial statements, and
the increasing cost of providing health
care benefits in general, many private-
sector companies began to overhaul
their retiree medical benefit plans to
control, reduce or eliminate costs.
Thus, there was a direct correlation
between the FASB’s issuance of FAS
106 and the decline in the percentage
of private-sector employers offering
retiree medical benefits.  This trend
will only increase with the FASB’s
issuance of FAS 158, which is
discussed in more detail in Part II.A.
B. Trends in the Public Sector
In contrast to private-sector employ-
ers, state governmental employers
actually increased their provision of
retiree health benefits between 1997
and 2002,from76 percent to 92 percent
for early retirees and from 69 percent
to 86 percent for Medicaid-eligible
retirees.75  Local governmental em-
ployers, on the other hand, followed
the private sector’s lead and decreased
their provision of retiree medical
benefits between 1997 and 2002, from
62 percent to 55 percent for early
retirees and from 47 percent to 35
percent for Medicaid-eligible retir-
ees.76   In 2003, all fifty states provided
medical benefits to early-retirees and
every state but two, Nebraska and
Indiana, provided medical benefits to
Medicaid-eligible retirees. With re-
spect to benefits offered to early-
retirees, sixteen states, including
Illinois, paid 100 percent of the
premium for at least the lowest-cost
plan offered, twenty-two states shared
the cost with the retirees and, in
twelve states, the retirees were
responsible for the entire cost of the
premium.77   Of the forty-one states
that reported providing some contri-
bution towards retiree medical ben-
efits, thirty states financed these costs
on a pay-as-you-go basis and eleven
states used a prefunding arrange-
ment.78   However, the states that
prefunded the benefit accounts did so
to a lesser degree than they funded
their pension accounts.
This approach may change, how-
ever, as the first phase of GASB
Statement No. 43: Financial Report-
ing for Post-Employment Benefit
Plans Other Than Pension Plans
(GASB 43) became effective in Decem-
ber 2006. GASB 43 requires public
employers to recognize and account for
retiree medical benefits in the same
manner as private-sector employers.
Similar to FAS 106, GASB 43 requires
public-sector employers to accrue the
future costs of retiree health benefits
during the years of active service of
their employees.79
The potential impact of GASB 43 is
difficult to determine based on the
variety of factors at play; however, it is
likely that those state employers who
are currently recording their retiree
medical benefit expenses on a pay-as-
you-go basis will incur a substantial
liability once they are forced to
recognize the expenses on an accrual
basis.80   In an August 2006 report,
retirement benefits specialists at J.P.
Morgan Chase projected the present
value of unfunded health care and
other non-pension benefits to be
between $600 billion and $1.3
trillion.81  The current unfunded
liability of approximately $300 billion
for public sector state pension plans
seems almost modest by comparison.
Among the states with the largest
unfunded health care and other non-
pension benefits are California ($70
billion), New York ($54 billion),
Maryland ($20 billion), Alabama
($19.8 billion), and Massachusetts
($13.2 billion).82
States and local governments have
begun to address the issue. For
example,New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg has pledged to set aside $1
billion for retiree health benefits, and
Hawaii, along with 2 other states,
plans to redefine the eligibility criteria
for full benefits, and will cut benefits
for dependents of employees hired after
June 30, 2001.83   In addition, within
the past two years, twenty-four states
increased cost-sharing, thirteen states
increased the retiree’s share of the
premium, and seven states created
multi-tier networks.84   However, as
with the pension issue, these changes
may be too little too late.
IV.Other Public and Private
Sector Comparisons
At one time, public employees could
regard higher retirement benefits as
compensation for lower current wage
rates.  Recently, this has become less
so.  As stated in a recent front-page
article in USA Today, “Contrary to a
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widely held notion, the extra govern-
ment benefits aren’t compensation for
lower pay.  Most government workers
are paid more than private employees
in similar jobs, and the wage gap is
growing.”85   This may be due, at least
in part, to the changes in union density
in both sectors to the changes in union
density in both setors.
Union membership peaked in 1979
with approximately 21 million mem-
bers.86   Between 1979 and 2003, the
number of members steadily declined
to 15.8 million workers.87   According to
2003 figures, 37.2 percent of workers
in the public sector are represented by
a union as compared to 7.2 percent in
the private sector.88   Between 1994 and
2003, the percentage of public sector
employees represented by unions
increased from 42.4 percent to 46.4
percent.89
In 2003,42.6 percent of local govern-
ment employees and 30.3 percent of
state employees were union members.
Over the past decade, union member-
ship has been declining at the local
level, but has remained fairly steady at
the state level.90  With respect to
compensation, most studies find that
the wages of union workers are higher
than the wages of nonunion workers,91
although it is difficult to verify this
with studies that make “apple to apple”
comparisons. Union representation
among public sector workers is
particularly high among teachers and
public safety personnel, which tend to
be the most highly compensated non-
executive positions in the public
sector, whether unionized or not.
Collective bargaining in the public
sector tends also to be a more
conservative process than what is
possible in the private sector due to the
legislative protections afforded retire-
ment plans in most states.  As a result,
radical changes are difficult to make
and slow in coming. In Illinois,
retirement benefits are largely pro-
tected from change through collective
bargaining, because they are set by
State legislation, and are protected
from erosion through collective bar-
gaining by Section 7 of the IPLRA.  The
conservative nature of change in
public sector bargaining is further
reinforced by the prevalence of interest
arbitration as a dispute resolution
mechanism for collective bargaining,
especially for public safety employees.
Radical breakthroughs are rarely
achieved through interest arbitra-
tion.92  In addition, much of the
retirement benefits for public sector
employees enjoy legal protection –
often found in state constitutions – far
greater than the legal protection
afforded to private sector employees.
While some states, such as Oregon
and California, are slowly making
changes by instituting a freeze on
pension plan participation for newly
hired employees, others, like Illinois,
continue to pretend these obligations
don’t exist. However, because the
majority of politicians have refused to
deal with the issue, taxpayers are
beginning to realize the enormous bill
with which they are faced, and are
making their voices heard through the
ballot box.93   For example, in Houston,
which has a plan that can give a 25-
year worker 90 percent of her salary in
retirement, complete with a 4 percent
annual cost-of-living increase, taxpay-
ers recently voted to give the city
government the right to renegotiate
the promised benefits under the
plan.94   And, in 2005, voters in New
Hampshire elected into office fiscal
conservatives who promised tax relief,
and passed propositions imposing
strict spending limits on local
governments.95   Once GASB 43 takes
effect, pension accounting experts and
taxpayers will know the full extent of
the problem, which should increase
the pressure on state and local
government officials to face the issue
and make changes.
V. Conclusion
Starting in 1983, private-sector em-
ployers began shifting their focus from
defined benefit plans to defined
contribution plans.  The trends toward
increasing reliance on defined contri-
bution plans and the decline of defined
benefit plans in the private sector are
slowly beginning to be replicated in the
public sector, and will continue to do so
as state and local governments try to
climb out of a deep financial hole
created by the provision of overly
generous pension benefits and a
history of underfunding.  Just as in the
private sector, these changes will be
spurred on by accounting reforms that
will shine the bright light of public
scrutiny on the mounting costs of
unfunded defined benefit plan commit-
ments.
The same pattern is likely to be
repeated in the area of retiree medical
benefits. Just as accounting rules
changes in 1990 precipitated a sharp
decline in retiree medical benefits in
the private sector, similar accounting
changes that became effective in
December 2006 in the public sector will
place mounting scrutiny and pressure
on government officials to curtail or
eliminate retiree medical benefits for
public employees. ?
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Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations commu-
nity. This issue focuses on develop-
ments under the two collective
bargaining statutes.
Arbitration
In Niles Township Federation of
Teachers v. Board of Education of
Niles Township, Case No. 2006-CA-
0036-C (IELRB 2006), the IELRB held
that the employer was entitled to raise
the question of arbitrability before the
arbitrator, even after it was ordered to
engage in arbitration by the IELRB.
The union had filed an unfair labor
practice charge after the employer
refused to arbitrate a grievance
regarding three non-tenured teachers
whose employment was ended at the
conclusion of the 2003-2004 school
year and the IELRB ordered the
employer to arbitrate.  Niles Town-
ship High School District 219, 21
PERI 104 (IELRB 2005). The employer
filed a motion with the arbitrator to
dismiss the proceedings on grounds
that the grievances were inarbitrable.
Shortly thereafter, the union filed an
additional unfair labor charge, claim-
ing that the motion to dismiss
improperly interfered with the union’s





The IELRB held that the employer
was not precluded from raising the
issue of substantive arbitrability
before the arbitrator, even though the
IELRB had previously ordered the
employer to arbitrate the grievances.
The IELRB relied on Staunton
Community Unit School Dist. No. 6 v.
IELRB, 200 Ill.App.3d 370, 588 N.E.2d
751 (4th Dist. 1990), where the court
stated in dicta that after the IELRB
finds a grievance arbitrable, “it goes to
the arbitrator, where the parties may
again raise arbitrability as well as the
merits of the grievance.”
In SEIU Local 73 v. Southern
Illinois University at Edwardsville,
No. 2006-CA-0025-S (IELRB 2006), the
IELRB affirmed the decision by the
Executive Director and determined
that the University did not violate
Sections 14(a)(1) and 14(a)(5) of the
Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Act (“Act”) when it implemented an
arbitration award because the award
was not contrary to Illinois statutes.
The union filed a grievance in April
2004 after the university laid off some
civil service cafeteria bargaining unit
employees over the summer while
continuing to hire student workers to
perform similar functions. The griev-
ance alleged that the university
violated Section 250.70(f)(2) of the
Rules of the State Universities Civil
Service System, which provides that “a
student employee shall not displace a
certified Civil Service employee,” and
Article V, Section 3 of the collection
bargaining agreement which stated
that nothing in the CBA shall
supersede the rules and regulations of
the State Universities Civil Service
System of Illinois.
The arbitrator rejected the union’s
argument, observing that the CBA
recognized that there were two
different classes of employees who
performed the same work, and there
was no “exclusive jurisdiction” over
the work. Each unit of employees was
?
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staffed independently, and “the mere
employment of a student to perform
work also done by bargaining unit
employees cannot be a displacement.”
The arbitrator did recognize Article
XIX, Section 4, of which the union did
not allege a violation, that stated the
percentage of work performed by the
bargaining unit employees shall not be
materially altered by student work-
ers. Thus, the arbitrator concluded
Article XIX, Section 4 “permits layoffs
of bargaining unit employees and
retention of students so long as the
percentage of work performed by the
two groups remains ‘appreciably the
same.’” Here, the percentage of bar-
gaining unit employees increased over
the summer from the spring, despite
the layoffs.
The union argued to the IELRB that
the arbitrator’s refusal to consider
evidence that the university violated
Article XIX, Section 4 of the CBA was
repugnant to the Act, and the award
violated clear public policy codified in
Section 250.70(f)(2). The IELRB reit-
erated that review of arbitration
awards is “extremely limited, and
awards must be construed, if possible,
as valid.” However, awards made
contrary to state law are not binding
under Section 10(b) of the Act, and
therefore an employer who imple-
ments such an award violates Sections
14(a)(5) and 14(a)(1). Here, the union
made no claim that the award violated
an Illinois statute, only public policy.
The IELRB concluded, “An employer’s
implementation of an award that
violates public policy or an adminis-
trative rule does not in itself violate
Section 14(a)(1) or 14(a)(5) of the Act.”
Furthermore, the Board found that
the award in this case did not violate
public policy, and the union’s real
argument was that the arbitrator
made the wrong decision.
Unit Clarification Petitions
In Niles Township High School
District 219 v. IELRB, 369 Ill. App. 3d
128, 859 N.E.2d 57 (1st Dist. 2006), the
First District Appellate Court held
that the IELRB erred in dismissing the
employer’s unit clarification petition.
The employer sought the removal of
three Information Systems (IS) em-
ployees, claiming they were confiden-
tial. The IS employees were part of the
original unit established prior to 1999,
but in May 2001 the employer adopted
a new computer-use policy, which gave
the IS employees unlimited access to
all employees’ and administrators’
workstations and files. The union
challenged some of these new com-
puter-use policy provisions, and an
agreement about the matter was not
reached until the winter of 2002. The
employer claimed the IS employees’
duties did not change until after
January 6, 2003, when the board of
education ratified the agreement. The
employer filed its petition for unit
clarification on May 30, 2003.
The ALJ found the employer did not
meet the three circumstances for a
unit clarification petition: (1) there is a
newly created job classification, (2) the
job functions of the existing classifica-
tion have changed substantially since
the unit was clarified, or (3) there has
been a statutory or case law change
that affects bargaining rights of
employees. The ALJ also decided, sua
sponte, that the petition was untimely
because it was filed two years after the
IS employees’ job responsibilities were
changed.
The IELRB overturned Community
High School District No. 218 2 PERI ¶
1087 (IELRB 1986) and held, “Unit
clarification petitions seeking to
exclude allegedly statutorily excluded
employees from a bargaining unit
must be filed within a reasonable
period.” The IELRB refused to consider
evidence of the winter 2002 agreement
and January 2003 school board
ratification because that evidence had
not been presented to the ALJ.
The court held that the ALJ violated
notice “that the ALJ was contemplat-
ing dismissal of its petition on an
untimeliness basis and . . . no
opportunity to be heard or make
arguments as to the issue.” Because
the additional evidence that the
employer sought to introduce before
the IELRB was in response to the
ALJ’s improper sua sponte untimeli-
ness ruling, the court found the
IELRB’s refusal to consider the
evidence was a further denial of the
employer’s procedural due process
rights.
The court also held that the IELRB’s
new rule on timeliness of unit
clarification petitions conflicted with
the court’s decision in Department of
Central Management Services v.
ILRB, 364 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 848 N.E.
2d 118 (1st Dist. 2006), which held that
a unit clarification petition seeking to
remove confidential employees may be
filed at any time.
IPRLA Developments
In State of Illinois, Department of
Central Management Services and
AFSCME Council 31, Case No. S-RC-
07-032 (ILRB State Panel 2006), the
State Panel dismissed AFSCME’s
petition to represent Technical Man-
ager IVs employed by the Illinois
Department of Central Management
Services (CMS). In its existing RC-62
unit, AFSCME sought to represent
eighteen Technical Manager IVs,
although there were approximately
two hundred state employees with that
title at different state agencies,
including CMS and the Department of
Transportation. CMS contended that
the petitioned-for unit was inappropri-
ate, because it sought to unionize only
some Technical Manager IVs.
The State Panel applied Dupage
County Board, 1 PERI ¶2003 (ISLRB
1985) which held that where an
employer has an established and
centralized job classification system, a
the employer’s procedural due process




presumption of inappropriateness is
warranted when the union has sought
to organize only a portion of employees
who perform duties in identical job
classifications. This presumption can
be overcome and a smaller unit can be
appropriate: 1) where an internal
cohesiveness existed and where such
factors as traditional historical pat-
tern of recognition or functional
integration sufficiently outweighed
the consideration of common person-
nel structure and the possibility of
fragmentation; or 2) where the facts
present a legitimate and rationale
basis for having a smaller unit.
AFCME argued that the exceptions
to the Dupage presumption applied.
First, AFCME claimed the CMS
Technical Manager IVs shared a
community of interest with Liability
Claims Adjusters, a group that was
already a part of the RC-62 unit. The
State Panel rejected this claim,
stating that similarity in job function
was not sufficient to establish a
community of interest strong enough
to overcome the presumption of
inappropriateness, especially because
the RC-62 unit included not just
Liability Claims Adjusters, but many
other job titles wholly different from
Technical Manager IVs. Further,
AFCME argued that dismissing the
representation petition would be
inconsistent with the IPLRA’s protec-
tion of an historical bargaining unit at
the Department of Transportation, as
the CMS Technical Manager IVs used
to work for that Department. The
Board found this “difficult to compre-
hend,” because AFSCME also asserted
that with the consolidation that moved
the Technical Manager IVs to CMS,
the historical factors  no longer
applied. Further, AFCME conceded
that the eighteen employees had never
been part of any bargaining unit in the
past.
Representation Elections
In Teamsters Local 714, Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, and
AFSCME Council 31, Case No. S-RC-
06-153 (ILRB State Panel 2006), the
State Panel affirmed the executive
director’s decision to certify Local 714
as the exclusive representative of a
group of Circuit Court of Cook County
employees over the incumbent
AFSCME’s objections.  In March 2006,
Board agents conducted a representa-
tion election at eleven locations over a
two-day period. During that time,
“electioneering” took place near the
polling locations, although a no-
electioneering zone was established
within the polling locations them-
selves. Local 714 won the election,
getting 765 votes to AFSCME’s 687
votes. AFSCME filed timely objec-
tions, claiming that the electioneering
tainted the election.
Applying the “laboratory condi-
tions” standard adopted in Illinois
Office of the Comptroller, 5 PERI
¶2010 (ISLRB 1989) the Panel held
that laboratory conditions were not
breached, because the electioneering
did not have a “reasonable tendency to
affect the outcome of the election.”
Under the Board’s Regulations, a
Board agent need not establish a no-
electioneering zone outside the polling
locations themselves, “for example to
encompass the area where employees
are waiting in line to vote . . . .” 80 Ill.
Admin. Code §§1200-1240. Thus, labo-
ratory conditions were not breached
when electioneering took place down
the hall from the polling locations. ?
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author illustrates how the past rise and
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AFL and CIO will eventually lead to
reinvigoration and revitalization of pub-
lic sector labor activities.
Calo, Thomas. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
CONTRACT AND THE UNION
CONTRACT: A PARADIGM SHIFT
IN PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS. PUBLIC PERSON-
NEL MANAGEMENT.  Vol. 35, no.
4. Winter 2006.  pp.331-342.
Union membership in the private sector
has suffered a steep decline over the past
40 years, while the public sector has seen
a steady increase in membership.  The
author first explores this issue by
investigating the reasons for this dis-
crepancy between the two sectors.  He
then argues that labor relations in the
public sector must change in response to
the growing power of public sector unions
and proposes models of positive public
employee relations when public unions
are gaining more influence and impact.
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